Should the law on abortion in England and Wales be changed?

This essay will argue in favour of a change to the law in one key respect, namely decriminalising all abortions. To do so, two key points will be made: abortion is morally defensible in most circumstances; in circumstances where abortion is, or may, not be morally acceptable, the criminal law is ill-equipped to deal with such issues sufficiently compassionately. To establish the first point, the current legal position will be assessed. Terminations are permitted up to 24 weeks, and up to full term in specific circumstances. The key reasons for this position are that the viability of the foetus, its ability to survive outside of the woman's womb, is typically realised around this time, but that other considerations override this where the exceptions apply. Clearly, this disregards the religious claim that 'life' begins at conception so as to make any abortion morally impermissible. This can be defended on the basis that the only explanation for such a claim is based on the 'possibility' of life, science having shown that the bundle of cells constituting an embryo are comparable to those on one's hands. But this argument can be traced back, and it can be asked at what stage might 'possibility' begin? The typical response from fundamentalist sects is that all instances of interfering with 'possibility' such as masturbation should also be banned, but the reasons behind such a claim are typically claims of 'faith' which do not have a valid place in controlling conduct through the law - since they are not based on objective reasons.

The hardest case presented to a 'pro-choice' advocate is that of a woman who simply changes her mind after some 38 weeks or so, and relies on her right to choose to justify a termination. Is this morally defensible? In circumstances where it would be possible to remove the baby and care for it such that it became capable of independent life, we might well conclude not. The operation of the aforementioned exclusions is typically predicated on some substantial effect on the mother, so as to outweigh the life of the foetus. At its strongest, with modern medicine, it might be argued that this amounts to valuing the mother's health, even in non-life threatening circumstances (or at least not necessarily so) such as rape, above an actual life, given our ability to care for such premature babies. This is a difficult moral question. But that is exactly what it is. Whilst it is, of course, the place of society, through the law, to encourage moral and discourage immoral conduct, that does not make it acceptable for the views of fractured minorities to be imposed upon a much larger majority, at least or as well as where the right course of conduct is so challenging to define. To continue therefore to criminalise abortions outside of the prescribed limits is to draw an unacceptably hard line between moral and immoral abortions. The principal criticism of decriminalisation is that it would remove any moral element from consideration, or else lead back to back-street abortions. This is because the system would either need to allow any kind of abortion, or else prescribe a system of licensing that refused access to free or even safe abortions to those who made their choice on 'immoral' grounds. Even accepting this as a reality, it can still be argued that it is preferable since those acting without licenses would bear the extent of criminal liability rather than the more vulnerable mothers, or else they would be able to offer them legally but with a cost, so as to allow in almost all cases, the individual to make the moral decisions themselves. And that is surely a goal to which we should all aspire.