To what extent was the policy of appeasement inevitable in the late 1930s?

Given the prevailing reformation of the balance of power in Europe due to the rise of nationalism and the ongoing Spanish Civil War from 1936-1939 which reflected a microcosm of interwar Europe, the Great Powers of Europe (Britain and France) opted for a policy of appeasement and concensus in international diplomacy. There are several variables which need to be analysed in order to delineate the extent to which appeasement was inevitable in the late 1930s, namely; (i) the 1929 Wall Street Crash and the resonance it had on European powers, (ii)Hitler's fairly successful expansionist Lebensraum policy which possed a direct threat to European serenity, (iii) the League of Nation's failure to adequately respond to crisis throughout the 1920s and the early 1930s with the most notable crises being Abyssinia 1935 and Manchuria 1931 and (iv) lastly the popular sentiments of the British and French electorate which opted for a rather reconcialiatory foreign policy in the second half of the 1930s.