To what extent did the failure of collective security result in the policy of appeasement in the mid 1930s?

The League of Nations was set up following World War One in 1920 with a goal of maintaining peace. The League pursued a policy of Collective Security, which revolved around the idea that war should not be used as a means of settling disputes between nations, and that aggressor nations should be pacified. Despite some success in mediating minor disagreements between nations, such as dividing Upper Silesia between Poland and Germany in 1921, overall the League came to be associated with major failures. Some major blows to the credibility of Collective Security included the invasion of Manchuria by the Japanese Kwantung army in 1931 in which the League was too slow to react to China's appeal for help, and ultimately the aggressor nation - Japan - was successful. Failures of collective security were also visible in Europe with events such as Italy's invasion of Abyssinia in 1935, and the withdrawing of Japan, Italy, and Germany from the League by 1937 illustrated its failure to contain the major aggressor states. Following this line of argument, it is clear why the League's policy of collective security was dropped by France and Britain, who then began to use appeasement in the hopes of pacifying the belligerent attitudes of Germany, Italy, and Japan. However, there is also evidence that appeasement was adopted by France and Britain mainly because of their internal situations.
Both Britain and France were struggling after the devastation of World War One, and almost more important than the international diplomatic situation for their governments was to get their country back on its feet. Public opinion was strongly against another war after the horrors of the first, and so the governments on both nations had to pursue a policy in line with this. Additionally, the economic situation in both countries was poor and furthered the anti-war sentiment as civilians wanted money to be spent on improving quality of life rather than military. Another view of this is that Chamberlain argued that Britain was not militarily prepared for war, so appeasement may also have been a way of buying them time to prepare. The Revisionist view of appeasement takes into account these issues, arguing that appeasement was in fact necessary for Britain and France given their internal problems and not solely a result of failing collective security. Overall, the failures of collective security in the 1930s did destroy its credibility, and may have led nations to look for other options leading to appeasement. Yet without an internal drive for peace within France and Britain in order to pacify their own civilians, there may not have been such a need for appeasement of the aggressor states in the run up to World War Two, and thus the League of Nations may have continued with its failing policy.